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Shocking Business Bankruptcy Law
Melissa B. Jacoby
abstrac t. The intersection of major crises and ﬁnancial distress generates no shortage of

stock stories. This Essay oﬀers one more: how shocks can be used opportunistically in big Chapter
11 cases to unravel bankruptcy law, and to shi� the system further away from the objective of responding to overindebtedness.

“To hear the principal dissent tell it, the world will end not in ﬁre, or
ice, but in a bankruptcy court.”
— Justice Sotomayor 1
introduction
The founders of my favorite ice-cream shop, Ample Hills Creamery, named
it a�er a Walt Whitman poem. 2 Perhaps with more knowledge of poetry and ice
cream than of business and ﬁnance, the owners expanded production and scoop
shops beyond a sustainable point. 3 On March 15, 2020, Ample Hills ﬁled for

1.
2.

3.
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Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665, 683 (2015).
Declaration of Phillip Brian David Smith at 3, In re Ample Hills Holdings, Inc., No. 20-41559
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2020), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/X4CBB5CN0JO9VJAPROSK7T52LG9/download [https://perma.cc/9MP4-7HA3].
See Courtney Rubin, The Shocking Meltdown of Ample Hills—Brooklyn’s Hottest Ice Cream Company, MARKER (Feb. 3, 2021), https://marker.medium.com/the-shocking-meltdown-of-ample-hills-brooklyns-hottest-ice-cream-company-66b27dc1791d
[https://perma.cc/77ZZCKLH].
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bankruptcy. 4 The COVID-19 pandemic did not prompt this ﬁling, but it shaped
what happened next. In the midst of the uncertainty and shutdowns this crisis
fostered, the bankruptcy court approved the only proposal on the table: sale of
Ample Hills to an Oregon gas-tank manufacturer for a disappointing one-million dollars. 5 The founders not only would lose all equity and leave the company
but would also have to ﬁle for bankruptcy themselves to get relief from obligations they had personally guaranteed. 6
The intersection of ﬁnancial distress and major crises generates no shortage
of stock stories. In a global pandemic, failure might seem all but inevitable
among concert venues, cruise lines, airlines, hotels, and the like. Or one might
think of the oil and gas industry, struggling with excess supply as demand plummeted. 7 But other stories that intersect with crises take diﬀerent trajectories, and
they too should be told.
In recent work, I considered how a shock like the global ﬁnancial crisis
prompted formal government responses, such as the creation of new administrative agencies. 8 Other work has highlighted how profound changes develop
through routine acts of repeat players within a legal system. 9 One does not need
Congress, an executive order, or a major Supreme Court decision to alter the law.

4.

Chapter 11 Voluntary Petition for Non-Individuals at 4, In re Ample Hills Holdings, Inc., No.
20-41559 (Mar. 15, 2020), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document
/X1AMNUGB0VO8J58E3N8D0M6VILE/download [https://perma.cc/TC8H-THDD].

5.

Exhibit A of Order of July 8, 2020, Asset Purchase Agreement art. 2, cl. 3, In re Ample Hills
Holdings, Inc., No. 20-41559 (July 8, 2020), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw
/document/X29KB1G1FBD9VOOV6KFEKG7T63I/download
[https://perma.cc/G4DU54WM]; About Schmitt Industries, SCHMITT INDUS., https://www.schmittindustries.com
/about-schmitt [https://perma.cc/4EAG-SEC2].
Voluntary Petition for Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy at 1-2, In re Smith, No. 1:20-BK43292 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2020), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/X2C6LOIKSDB8PCQV3QAU94UG24K/download [https://perma.cc/8543-7YKR].

6.

7.

Camila Domonoske, We’re Barreling Toward an Epic Glut of Oil, NPR (Mar. 20, 2020, 1:02 PM
EST), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/20/818457109/were-barreling-toward-an-epic-glut-of
-oil [https://perma.cc/43DQ-UNA2] (“With millions of people not taking trips, commuting
or ﬂying, the world’s appetite for oil has come crashing down, thanks to the coronavirus. At
the same time, a price war between giant producers Saudi Arabia and Russia has caused the
oil supply to swing up.”).

8.

Edward J. Balleisen & Melissa B. Jacoby, Consumer Protection A�er the Global Financial Crisis,
107 GEO. L.J. 813, 815, 818 (2019) (describing the concept of policy shock and exploring the
creation of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection following the global ﬁnancial crisis).
Melissa B. Jacoby, Ripple or Revolution? The Indeterminacy of Statutory Bankruptcy Reform, 79
AM. BANKR. L.J. 169, 176 (2005) (describing the particularly strong inﬂuence of day-to-day
actors in bankruptcy that shape the impact of statutory reform); Melissa B. Jacoby, The Bankruptcy Code at Twenty-Five and the Next Generation of Lawmaking, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221, 223,
236 (2004) (explaining that Congress can exclude bankruptcy professionals from the dra�ing

9.
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This Essay considers how a shock fuels problematic models of business
bankruptcy, particularly the practices I label “bankruptcy à la carte” and “oﬀlabel bankruptcy.” I focus on the liberties taken with Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code by enterprises much larger than my favorite ice-cream shop. Bankruptcy à la carte extracts the tools of Chapter 11 meant to be available only as part
of a package deal and redistributes the beneﬁts. 10 These tools override state law
on matters of contracts, asset sales, and loan priority. To the extent that these
tools are valid exercises of federal law through the Constitution’s Bankruptcy
Clause, 11 they make sense only as part of Chapter 11’s package deal. Standing
alone, they are suspect. Whatever the legal foundation, proponents of bankruptcy à la carte (including ﬁnancial institutions, hedge funds, private- equity
funds, and their restructuring professionals) misappropriate value meant for a
more diﬀuse group of stakeholders and capture it for themselves.12 Major shocks
help them get away with it.
In oﬀ-label bankruptcies, parties use the system to solve problems other than
unpayable debt loads (such as litigation management), and these parties demand additional perks that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize (such as
protecting a wide range of nondebtors during and a�er the bankruptcy). Proponents of oﬀ-label cases tout the broader policy beneﬁts of their proposals and
warn that the deal will unravel like a wool sweater if any thread is picked, putting
the court and potential objecting parties in a bind. Either courts and stakeholders
reluctantly sign oﬀ on the deal with these add-ons, perhaps demanding modest
concessions, or they call oﬀ-label bankruptcy proponents on their bluﬀ, risking
the loss of any beneﬁts the deal was expected to bring. Of course, major shocks
increase the pressure to keep the deal together.
One prominent add-on is called a “nondebtor release” or “third-party release.” It uses bankruptcy to insulate third parties from liability even though they
have not undertaken the burdens of bankruptcy.13 A particularly high-proﬁle example comes from the case of Purdue Pharma, the OxyContin producer purporting to use the bankruptcy system to resolve a national crisis it fueled: widespread

of statutes, but not from exerting inﬂuence in implementing those changes or other nonstatutory avenues of reform).
10. Melissa B. Jacoby, Bankruptcy à la Carte: An Autopsy 6-7 (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle
with author).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
12.

Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter
11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862, 895-910 (2014).

13.

Lindsey D. Simon, Bankruptcy Gri�ers, 131 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2022), https://ssrn.com
/abstract=3817530 [https://perma.cc/37PV-5V9H].
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opioid addiction and overdose. 14 Purdue Pharma and its owners, members of
the Sackler family, aggressively marketed opioids and downplayed addiction
risks. Yet, the Purdue Pharma Chapter 11 case provided members of the Sackler
family, and over a thousand other parties, with full insulation from liability without ﬁling for bankruptcy themselves.
This Essay unfolds as follows. Part I establishes the baselines for understanding Chapter 11 as a package deal with diﬀuse stakeholder beneﬁciaries. Part II
introduces the role of shocks in the ﬁnancial distress world and explores multiple
paths by which shocks inﬂuence Chapter 11, with an emphasis on the bankruptcy-á-la-carte and oﬀ-label models. Part II further recognizes the logistical
costs of a major shock, including impeding in-person negotiations. This Essay
concludes by noting the need for signiﬁcant structural changes to restore Chapter 11 as used by large enterprises.
i.

business bankrup tcy: a public-private
partners hip and a p ackage deal

Business bankruptcy is a public-private partnership. This characterization
comes from how the system is funded, who oversees it, and who sets the substantive rules. 15 Meant to facilitate the reorganization and preservation of forproﬁt and nonproﬁt enterprises, Chapter 11 bankruptcy is funded, for better or
worse, from a mixture of public and private sources. 16 Liabilities come from diverse legal doctrines, including contract, tort, statutory, regulatory, and sometimes even constitutional law. 17 The Bankruptcy Code allocates oversight responsibilities to both public parties (e.g., judges and a government watchdog)
and private parties (e.g., creditors’ committees and sometimes trustees). 18 Many
of Chapter 11’s requirements are mandatory, but the Bankruptcy Code also allows parties some latitude to cra� the terms of a restructuring deal. 19
In creating the architecture of this system, lawmakers balanced competing
concerns rather than promote a single interest. Normative pluralism is an

14.

See generally BETH MACY, DOPESICK: DEALERS, DOCTORS, AND THE DRUG COMPANY THAT ADDICTED AMERICA (2018); PATRICK RADDEN KEEFE, EMPIRE OF PAIN: THE SECRET HISTORY OF

THE SACKLER DYNASTY (2021).
15.

Melissa B. Jacoby, Corporate Bankruptcy Hybridity, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1715, 1719-21 (2018).

16.

Id. at 1726-27.
17. Id. at 1723.
18.
19.
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Id. at 1742.
Id. at 1727.
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acknowledged feature in other areas of law.20 The resulting statute is supposed
to respect a variety of public values regardless of whether they are expressly
named. The very short clause in Article I of the U.S. Constitution that authorizes
Congress to enact uniform laws of bankruptcy—known as the Bankruptcy
Clause—generally should not override other constitutional protections. 21 We do
not discard fundamental considerations of due process and equal protection, for
example, simply because of ﬁnancial diﬃculty. Rather than provide a license to
do anything and everything in the name of advancing one policy or another, conceptualizing business bankruptcy as a public-private partnership supports bankruptcy minimalism by strictly adhering to the law as written to focus on the system’s core function: resolving overindebtedness.
To address overindebtedness, the bankruptcy system includes potent powers: a temporary injunction to provide a breathing spell from collection,22 allowance of the majority of creditors to bind a minority to a new deal, 23 and a permanent injunction against debt collection. 24 To increase the odds of a conﬁrmed
Chapter 11 plan, thought to be particularly important when an enterprise is
worth more alive than dead, Congress provided legal perks not available in other
laws. These include incentives to provide ﬁnancing, 25 incentives to buy assets of
the bankruptcy estate with more legal certainty, 26 and alterations to the statelaw baseline regarding the treatment of contracts and leases. 27 These perks,
which have signiﬁcant distributional consequences, are hard to justify, and indeed make little sense, if delinked from the Chapter 11 package deal. Standing
alone, they are federal subsidies in strong tension with federalism. In addition,

20.

See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation of Powers Jurisprudence, 126
YALE L.J. 346, 351, 382 (2016) (discussing how normative pluralism shapes separation-ofpowers doctrine).
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see Jacoby, supra note 15, at 1723 (“Constitutional and quasi-constitutional matters cannot be kicked to the curb simply because a company experiences ﬁnancial
distress and initiates a Chapter 11 case.”).
22.

11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2018) (enjoining the enforcement of prebankruptcy claims temporarily).
Id. § 1126(c) (accepting the plan if favored by creditors holding at least two-thirds in dollar
amount and more than half in the number of allowed claims).
24. Id. § 1141 (conditioning a Chapter 11 debtor’s discharge of debt); id. § 524 (deﬁning the discharge injunction generally).
25. Id. § 364 (listing escalating incentives to loan money to debtors).
23.

26.

Id. § 363(b), (c), (f) (authorizing sales of bankruptcy estate property and determining the
extent to which such sales are free and clear of existing interests).

27.

Id. § 365 (authorizing the assumption, rejection, and assignment of leases and contracts under
particular conditions); id. § 502 (limiting damage claims for certain rejected leases).
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while the statutory language is far from perfect, Congress wrote these perks with
limits and standards that day-to-day practice and court decisions have eroded.28
Two core features of Chapter 11 should also be ﬂagged. First, relief is supposed to be premised on extensive and prompt disclosure. For example, when
the gun and bullet maker Remington Outdoor Company ﬁled for a second bankruptcy, grieving parents who lost children in the Sandy Hook murders wanted
more time to gather information about the company’s ﬁnances. 29 Remington
protested, “[J]ust because we ﬁled for bankruptcy doesn’t give [the Sandy Hook
families] a right to sort of walk around and look and snoop around our business.” 30 But it was wrong. Bankruptcy entitles claimants to do exactly that. 31
Second, access to Chapter 11’s package deal is premised on having a goodfaith reason to ﬁle for bankruptcy in the ﬁrst place. A particularly high-proﬁle
example is the National Riﬂe Association (NRA), which ﬁled for bankruptcy in
2021 in order to exert leverage over state regulators, rather than to address overindebtedness or some other ﬁnancial problem. 32 Although the NRA received
four months of bankruptcy protection and multiple opportunities to explain why
it was a valid candidate for federal bankruptcy relief (including a twelve-day

28.

Jacoby, supra note 10, at 6-7.

29.

Objection of the Sandy Hook Families to Debtors’ Motion for (I) An Order Establishing Bidding Procedures and Granting Related Relief and (II) An Order or Orders Approving the Sale
of the Debtors’ Assets at 19-23, In re Remington Outdoor Co., No. 20-81688 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala.
Aug.
7,
2020),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document
/X43USEE14NG9TNPH0D3K2KP3L44/download [https://perma.cc/84V8-UTH9].

30.

Transcript of Motions Hearing at 29, In re Remington Outdoor Co., No. 20-81688 (Aug. 18,
2020), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/X4F947002PQ8CDRFS
U83FHEUM8K/download [https://perma.cc/6HJB-J2AK]. Skeptical that the Sandy Hook
families might be on a ﬁshing expedition for their wrongful-death lawsuit rather than to pursue their creditor rights in the bankruptcy, the presiding judge accepted this argument to a
surprising extent. See Transcript of Applications for Employment at 51, In re Remington Outdoor Co., No. 20-81688 (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/X3JJFHKH9LO9NQAQMVH5R4JHQ2D/download
[https://perma.cc/B5DYC4AU] (“And this is another example of what I see as an attempt to bring the state court
litigation into the bankruptcy court process when the focus here is diﬀerent and the issues
here are diﬀerent.”).

31.

E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 521(a) (2018) (requiring disclosures for all debtors); id. § 1125 (requiring adequate information before allowing debtors to solicit votes on a Chapter 11 plan); FED.
R. BANKR. P. 2004 (permitting examinations relating to “the acts, conduct, or property or to
the liabilities and financial condition of the debtor, or to any matter which may affect the
administration of the debtor’s estate, or to the debtor’s right to a discharge”).

32.

Nathan Bomey, The National Riﬂe Association Says Its Finances Are Solid. So Why Is It Filing for
Bankruptcy?, USA TODAY (Jan. 28, 2021, 4:29 PM ET), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2021/01/28/nra-bankruptcy-national-riﬂe-association-chapter11/6657581002 [https://perma.cc/T2KD-S5ZR].
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trial), it was ultimately thrown out of the system because it was unable to show
that it had a valid ﬁnancial reason to be there. 33
Overall, the Bankruptcy Code oﬀers a balanced process to reorganize or sell
a company as a going concern through a Chapter 11 plan. It includes disclosures,
creditor voting, and a list of substantive standards by which to measure a plan’s
propriety, including that the plan be “fair and equitable.” 34 The integrated package is meant to promote due process, as well as more accurate valuation and distribution. 35 As we will see in Part II, shocks and crises create leverage to alter the
package deal, both by unbundling it and adding consequential extralegal ornaments.
ii.

crises remake big-business bankruptcy

Never is there a dull moment for a teacher and scholar of bankruptcy law,
but some moments are more consequential than others. So far, my academic career has spanned the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the global ﬁnancial crisis, and the
COVID-19 pandemic—events that materially changed the ﬁnancial landscape
and context of debtor-creditor relationships, along with everything else. In looking back on my own publications, it is striking how many have been reactions to
a major crisis. 36 This timeframe has also covered localized disasters such as Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, Hurricane Maria in September 2017, and the polar-vortex storm in Texas in February 2021.
I avoid the qualiﬁer “exogeneous” to describe shocks, as it can bring more
heat than light. A business’s existing ﬁnancial state aﬀects how it bears a major
shock. Even when a company blames the pandemic for its bankruptcy, we should

33.

Order Granting Motions to Dismiss, In re Nat’l Riﬂe Ass’n of Am., 628 B.R. 262 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 2021) (No. 21-30085).
34. 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (2018) (describing voting requirements); id. § 1129 (outlining plan-conﬁrmation standards, including distribution of value).
35. Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating Value in Chapter
11, 96 TEX. L. REV. 673, 706-07 (2018).
36. In addition to those already mentioned, see, for example, Melissa B. Jacoby, Home Ownership
Risk Beyond a Subprime Crisis: The Role of Delinquency Management, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2261
(2008), which explains that the ﬁnancial crisis revealed how mortgage-delinquency management needs to be a more enduring part of housing policy rather than just a crisis response;
Melissa B. Jacoby, The Value(s) of Foreclosure Law Reform, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 511 (2010), which
discusses how ﬁnancial-crisis responses revealed the need for disaggregating the type of housing tenure from housing stability and addressed the mistaken narrow scope of mortgageforeclosure reform; and Melissa B. Jacoby, Bankruptcy Reform and the Financial Crisis, 13 N.C.
BANKING INST. 115 (2009), which cites the need to integrate bankruptcy law with mortgagedelinquency management and discusses legislative proposals to permit home-mortgage modiﬁcation in personal bankruptcy as a foreclosure-crisis response.
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ask whether it was in stable condition beforehand, or whether it kept itself aﬂoat
by using easy access to cheap credit. 37 As rank-and-ﬁle employees of high-touch
industries suﬀered health-wise and ﬁnancially during the pandemic, companies
found creative ways to further boost the compensation of their wealthiest executives. 38
Bankruptcy is meant to make the best of a bad situation. However, its potent
tools do not always align with the problems brought to its door. We should look
closely when large enterprises with the highest-compensated professionals—as
well as their lenders and potential acquirers—use a crisis to justify cutting corners or pushing legal boundaries. In this Part, I explore how crises inﬂuence
Chapter 11, focusing on bankruptcy à la carte, oﬀ-label models, and the logistical
impact of major shocks.
A. Bankruptcy à la Carte
Congress balanced a variety of concerns in creating Chapter 11’s package deal,
and its beneﬁciaries are diﬀuse. By contrast, professionals and repeat-player
lenders and investors who shape big Chapter 11 bankruptcies today are highly
concentrated and relatively homogenous. 39 If they can extract Bankruptcy Code
perks without having to endure the oversight, checks and balances, and potentially longer timeline the package deal requires, why would they do otherwise?
To accomplish this unbundling, they are assisted by modern-day big-business bankruptcy practice, which ﬂattens many legal issues into the objective of
maximizing economic value. That is an unduly simplistic view of the objectives
of the normatively pluralistic Chapter 11. Only a few provisions of Chapter 11
speciﬁcally mention something akin to value maximization. Other provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code concern themselves with matters such as due process, the
right to vote, discrimination, and distributional concerns. 40 Even if these
37.

Sheila Bair & Lawrence Goodman, Corporate Debt ‘Relief’ Is an Economic Dud, WALL ST. J. (Jan.
6, 2021, 6:30 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/corporate-debt-relief-is-an-economicdud-11609975810 [https://perma.cc/36XA-Y5JU] (critiquing the Federal Reserve intervention in corporate-credit markets).

38.

Sarah Anderson & Sam Pizzigati, Pandemic Pay Plunder: Low-Wage Workers Lost Hours, Jobs,
and Lives. Their Employers Bent Rules to Pump up CEO Paychecks, INST. POL’Y STUD. 1 (May
2021), https://ips-dc.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/report-executive-excess-2021-PDF
.pdf [https://perma.cc/VZM4-9M4W] (reporting on the $56 million compensation package
of Hilton’s CEO); id. at 5 (showing that Carnival Cruiseline paid consultants to ﬁnd ways to
beef up the CEO’s retention bonus).

39.

Jacoby, supra note 15, at 1743-46.
40. E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2018) (requiring disclosure-statement approval before soliciting votes);
id. § 1126 (voting rules); id. § 1129(b)(1) (requiring consideration of unfair discrimination
toward a dissenting class).
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transactions always maximized economic value (and that proposition is dubious) nothing in these Bankruptcy Code provisions suggests that economic-value
maximization trumps statutory requirements. A common variant, especially in
the face of crises, is to ﬂip around value maximization and warn that the entity
is a melting ice cube. 41 To the bankruptcy court, repeat-player lenders and investors essentially say, “give me what we want or all the money and jobs will go
away,” picking and choosing among the perks of Chapter 11, using the ones that
beneﬁt them and ﬁnding creative ways to invalidate the rest. 42 They transform
the value maximization mantra into a subsidy for themselves.
Unbundling also is fueled by embracing the potential of market forces in
their theoretically perfect form rather than in their reality. Some judges understandably want to believe that the presence of private parties and assertions of
arms-length bargaining will generate a market-rate transaction. 43 But private
structuring of transactions does not necessarily yield market value, inside and
outside bankruptcy. 44 From the perspective of some lenders and acquirers, the
key objective is to produce a transaction that is not actually market rate. And it
is hard to blame them. They are entitled to represent their own interests and they
lack ﬁduciary duties to the bankrupt enterprise.
A key example involves distressed business buyers’ insistence on acquiring
companies in standalone going-concern sales within a bankruptcy, rather than
as part of a Chapter 11 plan or outside of the bankruptcy system. That insistence
is typically fueled by a lender willing to fund the case as a bridge to a sale but
nothing more. 45 The standalone sale avoids subjecting it to creditor voting, as
would be necessary in a Chapter 11 plan, or complying with all of the substantive

41.

Jacoby & Janger, supra note 12, at 866-67.
42. A more detailed explanation of the operation of bankruptcy à la carte begins in Jacoby, supra
note 15, at 1731, 1735, and continues in Jacoby, supra note 10, pt. I. For a thoughtful look at
when job saving should tip the scale toward reorganization, see Zachary Liscow, Counter-Cyclical Bankruptcy Law: An Eﬃciency Argument for Employment-Preserving Bankruptcy Rules, 116
COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (2016).
43.

LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE 73 (2005) (critiquing judges who assumed that agreements of parties reﬂect the market at work); see also Transcript of Motions Hearing, supra note
30, at 40 (“[W]hen you have a sale under 363 in a Chapter 11 the best evidence of value is the
audit and sale – or auction and sale process. So I’m still struggling with why valuation of the
assets from 2018 to present is relevant to an objection to a sale in 2020.”).
44. See, e.g., Guhan Subramanian & Annie Zhao, Go-Shops Revisited, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1215, 125354 (2020) (describing investment bankers’ conﬂicts of interest in which they are better oﬀ
favoring buyers, particularly private-equity buyers, than getting a higher price for the seller);
Diane Lourdes Dick, The Chapter 11 Eﬃciency Fallacy, 2013 BYU L. REV. 759 (2013).
45. Jacoby, supra note 10; Melissa Jacoby, Loans and Liens: The Weinstein Company Chapter 11 Hearing #3, CREDIT SLIPS (Apr. 27, 2o18, 11:34 AM), https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2018/04/weinstein-hearing-3.html [https://perma.cc/5UTL-Y5D9].
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plan requirements. The Bankruptcy Code anticipates going-concern sales to be
accomplished through plans, and does not protect buyers of companies from
potential successor liability in standalone sales. 46 Indeed, bankruptcy policy is
widely assumed to respect state and other applicable non-bankruptcy-law baselines unless it is imperative to do otherwise. 47 Some federal circuit courts nonetheless have upheld broad orders protecting acquirers in standalone sales, fearing that the acquirer will simply walk unless it gets what it wants—even if
walking would be economically irrational. 48 Bankruptcy therefore presents a
loophole to the seriousness with which federal and state courts otherwise take
successor liability. 49 Insistence on bending the rules to preserve economic value
is not neutral. In practice, it tends to suppress the legal rights of individuals with
less political, economic, and social power, while the dollars ﬂow elsewhere.
What do major shocks have to do with bankruptcy à la carte? Both nothing
and everything. The global ﬁnancial crisis played a signiﬁcant role in institutionalizing bankruptcy à la carte. A�er all, the Obama Administration coopted Chapter 11 to complete quick sales, stripped of the typical protections, to “save” Chrysler and General Motors. 50 When the ﬁnancial crisis came into the rear-view
mirror, bankruptcy à la carte did not. Arguments that value will be lost if the deal
is deferred have been in active rotation during the COVID-19 pandemic. 51
46.

George W. Kuney, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code Section 363( f) and Undermining the Chapter
11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235, 272-73 (2002).
47. The idea came from Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979), although it has little to do
with what actually happened in that case. See Juliet M. Moringiello, When Does Some Federal
Interest Require a Diﬀerent Result: An Essay on the Use and Misuse of Butner v. United States,
2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 657, 663 (2015); Juliet M. Moringiello, (Mis)use of State Law in Bankruptcy:
The Hanging Paragraph Story, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 963, 985-93.
48.

E.g., In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 2003); In re Leckie Smokeless Coal
Co., 99 F.3d 573 (4th Cir. 1996). But see Brief for Federal Appellants at 15, In re Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d 283 (No. 01-1788) (casting doubt on the prediction that the buyer would
walk away if required to honor employment-discrimination settlements and observing that
the value of the discrimination claims, relative to the sale price, would “represent, at most, not
even the tail, but the ﬂea wagging the dog”).

49.

See, e.g., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 544 (1964) (labor law);
Brzozowksi v. Corr. Physician Servs., 360 F.3d 173, 175 (3d Cir. 2004) (Title VII); Einhorn v.
M.L. Ruberton Constr. Co., 632 F.3d 89, 94-95 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[T]his court . . . has extended
the labor law successorship doctrine to employment discrimination claims under Title VII.”);
EEOC v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1090, 1093 (6th Cir. 1974) (sex
and race discrimination under Title VII).

50.

Jacoby & Janger, supra note 12, at 883-84.
51. E.g., Transcript of Emergency Status Conference at 13-14, In re Remington Outdoor Co., No.
20-81688-CRJ-11 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product
/blaw/document/X38LR0F4QH39B890CJV8Q3QFQDB/download
[https://perma.cc
/JA6A-3PMD] (stating that according to a government watchdog, “this has to be a fast sale
because of their lenders . . . and . . . potential purchasers which we understand have also

418

shocking business bankruptcy law

Threatening a loss of economic value and layoﬀs can also be eﬀective during
more placid times, but it becomes especially persuasive during a crisis for fear of
making a bad situation worse. Major shocks increase the power and leverage of
the arguments that the Chapter 11 package deal, with its emphasis on creditor
voting and speciﬁc distributional entitlements, is an unaﬀordable luxury. 52
The Bankruptcy Code is not perfect. But bankruptcy à la carte’s strategic unbundling of Chapter 11’s beneﬁts and obligations is an even less satisfying exercise of federal law, redistributing the perks in ways that tend to favor Wall Street
and disfavor Main Street. The tail of COVID-19-related bankruptcies is destined
to be long, so it is not too late to issue a warning: if powerful parties are permitted to cite shocks to justify bankruptcy à la carte, the existence of Chapter 11 will
become even more diﬃcult to justify.
B. Oﬀ-Label Bankruptcy
In the previous Section, we learned that when larger enterprises knock on
the bankruptcy-court door, what they request o�en does not match what the
Bankruptcy Code oﬀers. A second category of creative Chapter 11 use intersecting closely with major shocks involves expansive add-ons to bankruptcy relief
purported to be essential to keeping the deal together. In other words, while
some Chapter 11s unbundle the package deal, cherry-picking among the perks,
other Chapter 11s add perks to the package. 53
A notable expansion is seeking to protect third parties against liability without requiring them to ﬁle for bankruptcy themselves. The Bankruptcy Code expressly authorizes nondebtor releases only in the context of asbestos claims, and
there, only in a narrow set of circumstances.54 Circuit courts are not permissive
on nondebtor releases if you read the ﬁne print; they recognize that a nondebtor

requested a fast sale”); Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 93, In re Remington Outdoor Co.,
No. 20-81688-CRJ-11 (Sept. 29, 2020), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/X5TPCPTMQ JE81JOPO44LGD5UB5F/download [https://perma.cc/4LZL-Q7QZ]
(“[T]he only way in which they were willing to move forward would be by a M&A transaction
via a 363 process in Chapter 11.”); id. at 125 (discussing other potential buyers who said they
would consider purchasing only through a 363 sale). Ample Hills reported more or less the
same thing. See Declaration of Phillip Brian David Smith, supra note 2, at 10.
52. Jacoby & Janger, supra note 12 (discussing games of chicken played in big Chapter 11 cases
during and a�er the global ﬁnancial crisis).
53. Some cases involve both techniques. In the case of gun and bullet maker Remington Outdoor,
the attorneys found another euphemism when referring to releases: “It’s really a composite
deal.” Transcript of Motions Hearing, supra note 30, at 22.
54.

11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2018) (directing claims against insurance to a trust through a channeling
injunction).
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release is essentially a discharge without the rest of bankruptcy. 55 Requesting
nondebtor releases nonetheless has become common.56 Sometimes the potential
recipients of releases will even evoke sympathy, particularly if a shock is involved.
But sympathy does not make these releases a good policy extension of the federal
bankruptcy system.
For example, in February 2021, a polar-vortex storm generated a massive
power emergency in the state of Texas, resulting in huge price increases and massive power outages, ill-timed for the extreme cold weather. 57 Brazos Electric
Power Cooperative, a nonproﬁt wholesale provider of energy, and Griddy Energy, LLC, a retail electric provider, both ﬁled Chapter 11 in March 2021. 58 Griddy
used bankruptcy to close its doors a�er an oversight entity had already transferred away all of its customers. Griddy nonetheless intended for its Chapter 11
plan to result in a release of liability for a variety of third parties, including its
customers. 59 When the court asked what beneﬁt would ﬂow to the creditors and

55.

56.

See, e.g., In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc., 416 F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining
that nondebtor releases are expected to be rare and need to play an “important part in the
debtor’s reorganization plan” (quoting SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp. (In re Drexel
Burnham Lambert Grp.), 960 F.2d 285, 293 (2d Cir. 1992))); id. at 142 (“[A] nondebtor release
is a device that lends itself to abuse. . . . [I]n eﬀect, it may operate as a bankruptcy discharge
arranged without a ﬁling and without the safeguards of the Code.”); id. at 143 (determining
that the bankruptcy court’s ﬁndings were insuﬃcient to support a nondebtor release and dismissing the appeal as equitably moot); see also In re Cont’l Airlines, 203 F.3d 203, 212 (3d Cir.
2000) (invalidating a nondebtor release at issue in the appeal and reporting that releases have
been permitted only in “extraordinary cases”).

Simon, supra note 13.
See Declaration of Cli�on Karnei in Support of Chapter 11 Petition and Emergency First-Day
Motions at 23-27, In re Brazos Elec. Power Coop., No. 21-30725 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2021),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/X1DL0FQ4OBV9J7Q7JQS05U6D88B/download [https://perma.cc/TZ2H-MUM2].
58. Voluntary Petition for Non-Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy, In re Griddy Energy, LLC, No.
21-30923 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2021), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw
/document/X86KR8LI6M9B39CHTLF6GTJIE5/download
[https://perma.cc/2XURYYZM]; Voluntary Petition for Non-Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy, In re Brazos Elec. Power
Coop., No. 21-30725 (Mar. 1, 2021), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/X248NQGNQ3088PO6134JSDG3E9L/download [https://perma.cc/7Q2V-8MCE].
59. Indeed, the term “release” or “releases” appeared in one version of Griddy’s disclosure statement 194 times. Notice of Filing of Disclosure Statement for the Second Amended Plan of
Liquidation for Griddy Energy LLC Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Proposed
Disclosure Statement to Second Amended Plan), In re Griddy Energy, LLC, No. 21-30923 (Apr.
27, 2021), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/X7V1V3S0PJP94
RARBG1MI1EI91S/download [https://perma.cc/ZBM6-HGUZ]; see Vince Sullivan, Griddy’s
Chapter 11 Customer Release Plan Approved in Texas, LAW360 (July 7, 2021),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1401120/griddy-s-ch-11-customer-release-plan-approved
-in-texas [https://perma.cc/57HB-JRDW] (“In Griddy’s case, the releases go both ways as
57.

420

shocking business bankruptcy law

the estate from these releases, Griddy did not answer directly, instead emphasizing that the releases of nondebtor aﬃliates were “part and parcel” of the entire
deal; if the aﬃliates do not get the release, the other terms of the deal would fall
apart. 60 Griddy and the judge directly tied this argument to the extraordinary
storm that precipitated the liability. 61
Like bankruptcy à la carte, oﬀ-label bankruptcy does not arise solely from
large shocks. But shocks fuel its use. Recall Purdue Pharma, the OxyContin producer that went bankrupt in response to the opioid crisis. Personal-injury claimants and state attorneys general representing more than half the population of
the United States repeatedly objected to Purdue’s restructuring plans, arguing
they did not comport with the law. 62 From the outset, though, Purdue warned
that this integrated deal, including releases for the Sackler family and over a
thousand other parties, was the only way to ensure resources could be directed
to opioid-crisis abatement. 63 In other words, if public or private claimants opposed this plan, it would be the objectors’ fault that resources went to litigation
and lawyers instead of to abatement (not to mention compensation for grievous
harm).
The Sacklers’ expectation to be protected by the bankruptcy of the company
they owned stands in stark contrast to the owners of my favorite ice-cream place.
The Ample Hills Creamery founders devoted all their ﬁnancial resources to the
business and provided personal guarantees on business loans, like so many

customers won’t have to pay their bills, and Griddy won’t face any claims from those customers whose power was out for several days or who incurred large electric bills.”).
60. Transcript of Status Hearing/Motion Hearing (via Zoom) at 30-32, In re Griddy Energy, LLC,
No. 21-30923 (Apr. 29, 2021), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/X6G014RL7CJ8VRPFUE2UMBC6U5R/download [https://perma.cc/QHA7-GCXL].
61.

Id. at 31 (stating that, in light of the winter storm, Griddy’s argument was “certainly a fair
argument that it’s the right thing to do”).

62.

For a later example, see Ad Hoc Group of Non-Consenting States’ Objection to the Debtors’
Motion to Approve (I) the Adequacy of Information in the Disclosure Statement, (II) Solicitation and Voting Procedures, (III) Forms of Ballots, Notices and Notice Procedures in Connection Therewith, and (IV) Certain Dates with Respect Thereto at 1-5, 9, In re Purdue
Pharma L.P., No. 19-23649 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2021), https://www.bloomberglaw.com
/product/blaw/document/X7IKVHL54RD8PF8JITMU50KL8D9/download [https://perma
.cc/Z237-4P3B]. For an early example, see The States’ Coordinated Opposition to the Debtors’
Motion for Preliminary Injunction of States’ Law Enforcement Actions Against the Sacklers
at 1-2, Purdue Pharma, L.P. v. Massachusetts (In re Purdue Pharma, L.P.), No. 19-08289
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document
/X5SCIAP8IA49NLA5TFUOJ73NR0V/download [https://perma.cc/R9F6-XZRS].
63. Debtors’ Informational Brief at 3-5, 44-45, 49, In re Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 19-23649 (Sept.
16, 2019), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/XSB00DA59U9A
58LC0O88KO743U/download [https://perma.cc/UV9G-A7AV].
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small-business owners do. 64 To get debt relief, the founders had to ﬁle for bankruptcy themselves—a reminder that small-business owners o�en do not enjoy
the largess extended to bigger businesses. 65
I highlight nondebtor releases because they are a common yet extraordinary
oﬀ-label demand, as well as one that Congress has expressed interest in reforming. 66 But the potential irregularities that an oﬀ-label bankruptcy might incorporate in the name of achieving a far-ﬂung policy objective are virtually unlimited. For example, a settlement agreement in the Purdue Pharma bankruptcy
required that the judge appoint a “special master” to carry out particular tasks,67
even though special masters are explicitly disallowed in bankruptcy cases.68
However nitpicky this observation might seem, it reﬂects a larger issue: the belief that the bankruptcies of large enterprises can continuously override existing
law and rules in the name of responding to crises.
C. Logistical Eﬀects of a Shock
The unintended consequences of shocks can have powerful logistical implications. For example, the COVID-19 pandemic has complicated federal courts’
strong preference for settlements and the means courts use to reach them. Like
federal courts generally, the bankruptcy system greatly values negotiations and
settlements. 69 To the extent that a court is experiencing a high volume of cases,
or that a crisis makes it more diﬃcult for a court to handle those cases, the pressure to settle might increase. 70 Judges are not always subtle about conveying
64.

See generally Ruth Simon & Heather Haddon, Small-Business Owners Feel Weight of Personal
Debt Guarantees, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 4, 2021, 1:07 PM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/small-business-owners-personal-debt-guarantees-coronavirus-pandemic-11617555245
[https://perma.cc/47NY-GZYB] (discussing the impact of personally guaranteeing business
debt during the pandemic).

65.

For the criminal-law analogy, see JENNIFER TAUB, BIG DIRTY MONEY: THE SHOCKING INJUSTICE AND UNSEEN COST OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME (2020).

66.

SACKLER Act, H.R. 2096, 117th Cong. (2021).
67. Exhibit B to Mediator’s Report at 15, In re Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 19-23649 (July 7, 2021),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/XRFG32BHD48FS83LKFHQP6
UPO7/download [https://perma.cc/QF2U-ANAF] (noting the appointment of a special
master for disclosure oversight as a term to be added to the Purdue Pharma plan).
68. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9031 (making Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 inapplicable in bankruptcy
cases); Paulette J. Delk, Special Masters in Bankruptcy: The Case Against Bankruptcy Rule 9031,
67 MO. L. REV. 29 (2002).
69.

Melissa B. Jacoby, What Should Judges Do in Chapter 11?, 2015 ILL. L. REV. 571, 574-81 (comparing the settlement-promotion history of bankruptcy courts and federal district courts).

70.

In an interview during the ﬁnancial crisis, Chief Judge Mary F. Walrath of the Delaware bankruptcy court observed, “If I feel that the parties can resolve this or should resolve this on a
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their view that litigation is an unaﬀordable luxury or that failure to reach agreement will disappoint them. 71
Although a major shock might increase the perceived need for nontrial resolution, a crisis can itself alter the process of negotiating toward majority support.
For example, when governments mandated social distancing in response to
COVID-19, technology allowed the show to go on to some extent. But Zoom
negotiations and in-person negotiations are not the same, as a lawyer representing Purdue Pharma made clear:
Unfortunately, one of the realities we all face in this situation and others
is that the new remote environment . . . takes away many of the pressurization tools normally open to mediators, including hauling senior principals to meetings or keeping parties sequestered in conference centers,
sometimes with no food or water, to facilitate resolution. 72
The lawyer continued that “with no ability to be dragooned and stared down by
mediators and forced to stay until two in the morning,” lawyers and parties
would “need some external help pressurizing this phase of the mediation [to] go
on to the next phase.” 73 The presiding judge ultimately ordered parties to
business basis, I feel my obligation is to push them toward that . . . But I’m ready to make a
decision based on the evidence they present if they cannot agree.” Ann Farmer, Bankruptcy
Judges Feel the Pain, 18 PERSPECTIVES 10, 14 (2009); see also Maria Chutchian, Delaware’s Chief
Bankruptcy Judge Wants to Stay out of Your Business, REUTERS LEGAL (Feb. 26, 2021) (“Chief
Judge Christopher Sontchi, who oversees Delaware’s bustling bankruptcy court, has determined that the best way to handle messy commercial bankruptcies is to encourage the key
players to work out their issues for themselves.”).
71. E.g., Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 33 YALE J. ON
REGUL. 55, 74, 81-88 (2016).
72. Transcript at 29, In re Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 19-23649 (July 23, 2020),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/X5E4IAK4AD9SCPM5882NG
3VVDA/download [https://perma.cc/NN9K-RGM4]. The impact of the pandemic on settlement dynamics was mentioned in other large cases. Transcript at 13, Century Indem. Co. v.
Boy Scouts of Am. (In re Boy Scouts of Am.), 630 B.R. 122 (Bankr. D. Del. March 18, 2021)
(No. 20-10343) (“[W]e’re particularly frustrated that because of the impact of COVID we
have been unable to have in-person face to face mediation sessions. . . . Well that has been
extremely frustrating from a mediation experience. And that has made our bankruptcy mediation, which as you will recall kicked oﬀ in the middle of COVID, extraordinarily challenging.
And I don’t think that is putting it mildly.”); Notice of Submission of Written Remarks of
Chief Judge Barbara J. Houser, Mediation Team Leader, During November 15, 2017 Omnibus
Hearing, In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R., 432 F. Supp. 3d 25 (D.P.R. Nov. 15, 2017)
(No. 17-3283) (noting “Hurricane Maria has caused some disruption to our mediation process”).
73. Transcript, supra note 72, at 50. Purdue Pharma’s lead lawyer later said that it was the presiding
judge who strongly suggested using a judicial mediator. See Notes on Telephonic Hearing of
May 20, 2021, In re Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 19-23649 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (on ﬁle with author).
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participate in lengthy in-person negotiations overseen by a fellow sitting judge,
a�er which ﬁ�een long-opposed parties agreed to drop their ﬁght. 74
The moral of this story: those of us interested in how shocks aﬀect the operation of legal systems must keep our eyes open for the little things as well as the
big ones. By shi�ing the logistics, shocks may also alter negotiations and how
matters get resolved.
conclusion
By the time this Essay went to press, the founders of my favorite ice-cream
shop had opened The Social, a new ice-cream and donut business. 75 New York’s
senior U.S. Senator Chuck Schumer attending the grand opening, pronouncing
that “Brooklyn always gets better.” 76 Even a�er having to ﬁle their own personal
bankruptcy to accompany the Ample Hills bankruptcy, they beat the odds and
started fresh.
The impact of major shocks on the lives and livelihoods of real people—from
a global ﬁnancial crisis to a catastrophic storm or hurricane, to a pandemic that
has generated death, illness, and ﬁnancial despair—is profound. When risks are
too vast to be privately insurable, we o�en look to public institutions or publicprivate partnerships to manage crises. 77 Bankruptcy for individuals and small
businesses has its own share of problems in need of reform, but sometimes better
options are not in sight.
Big-business bankruptcy is a diﬀerent world. This Essay has observed how
crises dovetail with the melting ice-cube arguments that big companies and their
74.

Mediator’s Report, In re Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 19-23649 (July 7, 2021),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/X1Q6O4E0J382/download
[https://perma.cc/46JZ-AUCR] (reporting on one twelve-hour in-person mediation and a
second sixteen-hour in-person mediation); Order Establishing the Terms and Conditions of
Mediation Before the Honorable Shelley C. Chapman at 3, In re Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. 1923649 (May 18, 2021), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document
/X1Q6O4E0J382/download [https://perma.cc/RUR3-LWKD] (ordering in-person mediation if needed).
75. Robb Mandelbaum, How the Founders of a Failed Ice Cream Chain Plotted Their Return, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 3, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-10-03/ample-hillscreamery-founders-on-making-a-comeback-a�er-bankruptcy
[https://perma.cc/CD3W95BG].
76. Jake Samieske, Ample Hills’ Founders Open a New Shop, Called the Social, BROOKLYN (July 26,
2021), https://www.bkmag.com/2021/07/26/ample-hils-founders-open-a-new-shop-calledthe-social [https://perma.cc/69ZR-UKQS]; Scott Lynch, The Ample Hills Founders Open
Their New Ice Cream Shop “The Social” in Prospect Heights, GOTHAMIST (July 26, 2021),
https://gothamist.com/food/ample-hills-founders-open-their-new-ice-cream-shop-socialprospect-heights [https://perma.cc/2UZG-SNHF].
77. Melissa B. Jacoby, Bankruptcy Reform and Homeownership Risk, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 323, 323.
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lenders and acquirers use to remix the system, redistributing costs and beneﬁts.
The federal government already subsidizes the beneﬁciaries of bankruptcy à la
carte and oﬀ-label bankruptcy. It does not need to do so through the bankruptcy
system.
It will take more than words, tinkering around the edges, or even a lack of
shocks to reverse these trends. The ﬁnancial plumbing of Chapter 11 is at the
heart of the problem. For example, so long as a lender to a bankrupt company
can dictate by contract how much or little of Chapter 11 can be used, or can attach
other strings, it will be diﬃcult to halt the unbundling of modern bankruptcy
cases. A roster of alternative ﬁnancing ideas is out there. In other areas, scholars
have argued that the public or nonproﬁt sectors should oﬀer services to compete
with, rather than replace, private options. 78 Exploration of alternative Chapter
11 ﬁnancing, including the use of government guarantees and crowdfunding, has
grown in recent years. 79 But ultimately, something even more far-reaching might
be required to sever the power of funders and buyers to determine which parts
of bankruptcy are used and which lie dormant.
We might also consider a diﬀerent structural question: how many judges
should oversee a very large bankruptcy case in the ﬁrst instance? When a troubled enterprise is on the front page of national news-media outlets, with the effects of the crisis ﬂowing fast and furious, judges can be put in an impossible
position, and their cases can feel unduly personalized. 80 Bankruptcy courts

78.

See GANESH SITARAMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE PUBLIC OPTION 6 (2019) (deﬁning public options as the government oﬀering quality products for a guaranteed price); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Publicly Funded Objectors, 19 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 47, 60 (2018); ELIZABETH
CHAMBLEE BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS: BACKROOM BARGAINING IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION
88 (2019) (discussing the importance of dissent to disrupt norm entrenchment among professionals); Heather K. Gerken & Alex Tausanovitch, A Public Finance Model for Lobbying:
Lobbying, Campaign Finance, and the Privatization of Democracy, 13 ELECTION L.J. 75, 76 (2014)
(proposing publicly funded policy-research consultants to ameliorate the impact of lobbyists
for private industry on legislative development).

79.

See Jacoby, supra note 15, at 1742-43 (proposing a Sunlight Fund); Jonathan Gordon, Government Guaranties for Corporate Bankruptcies, 43 VT. L. REV. 251, 287-300 (2018); Anthony Tamburro, Comment, Far from the Madding Crowd: Crowdfunding a Small Business Reorganization,
34 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 521, 522 (2018); David McGrail, Crowdfunding a Chapter 11 Plan,
Feature, 32 AM BANKR. INST. J, Feb. 2013, at 1 (describing exit ﬁnancing); Jon Henes, Why the
Feds Should Step into Bankruptcy Loans, CNBC (Oct. 22, 2008), https://www.cnbc.com/id
/27319457 [https://perma.cc/E9XL-GC8S] (proposing the “Distressed Company Loan Guaranty Program of 2008”); Mitt Romney, Opinion, Let Detroit Go Bankrupt, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
18, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/opinion/19romney.html [https://perma
.cc/L982-LBRR] (“The federal government should provide guarantees for post-bankruptcy
ﬁnancing and assure car buyers that their warranties are not at risk.”).
80. Jacoby & Janger, supra note 12, at 886-89.
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already have the authority to hold hearings jointly on the trial level. 81 In some
circuits that have authorized Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, they sit in groups to
hear appeals. 82 Rather than asking judges to simply try harder to resist personalization of responsibility to avert the alleged consequences of denying the relief
powerful parties request, judges could sit jointly in panels, operating en banc, to
oversee particularly high-proﬁle cases.
Finally, meaningful reform will hinge on demography. Crises tend to be regressive, hitting hardest the communities already le� behind. COVID-19 oﬀered
a potent reminder that crisis interventions can double down on existing inequalities. 83 The homogeneity of elite restructuring professionals makes it especially
problematic for bankruptcy to be the inevitable catchall crisis response. 84 This
dynamic cannot be solved from the outside in; the restructuring world needs to
examine and improve itself from the inside out.

81.

See, e.g., In re Outen, 220 B.R. 26, 26 n.1 (1998) (“[B]ankruptcy judges in a given district may
promulgate rules to divide cases and business as they deem appropriate.” (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 154(a) (2018))); In re Iron-Oak Supply Corp., 162 B.R. 301, 305 (1993) (equating express
authorization for joint hearings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42 with the power to
hold en banc hearings); In re Ludwick, 185 B.R. 238, 239-40 (1995) (exemplifying an en banc
hearing for attorney misconduct).

82.

BAP Court Information, U.S. CTS. NINTH CIR., https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/bap/court-information [https://perma.cc/S3T4-N7TZ].

83.

Stacy Cowley, Minority Entrepreneurs Struggled to Get Small-Business Relief Loans, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/04/business/ppp-loans-minority-businesses.html [https://perma.cc/7VGM-ZZSK] (reporting on Small Business Administration
data and reporting that interviews indicate “Black- and other minority-owned businesses
were disproportionately underserved by the relief eﬀort, o�en because they lacked connections to get access to the aid or were rejected because of the program’s rules”); Jonnelle Marte,
Minority-Owned Businesses Struggle to Access Credit During Pandemic, Fed Survey Finds, REUTERS (Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-fed-smallbusiness/minorityowned-businesses-struggle-to-access-credit-during-pandemic-fed-survey-ﬁnds-idUSKBN
2A32OS [https://perma.cc/LFX8-9PRL] (“For instance, the ﬁrst round of funding in PPP
loans issued last spring went disproportionately to non-minority businesses, according to a
research published in January by Robert Fairlie from the University of California at Santa
Cruz and Frank Fossen of the University of Nevada.”); Adhiti Bandlamudi & Matthew Green,
Unequal Distribution: How Businesses in East Oakland and Other Communities of Color Missed
Out on PPP Loans, KQED (May 11, 2021), https://www.kqed.org/news/11872011/unequaldistribution-how-businesses-in-east-oakland-and-other-communities-of-color-missed-outon-ppp-loans [https://perma.cc/6DQX-4VG5] (“Yet, a Reveal analysis of more than 5 million
PPP loans issued during the ﬁrst two rounds of funding from April through August found
sweeping racial disparities in how that money was distributed, with businesses in largely
white neighborhoods receiving loans at a far greater rate than those in neighborhoods with
signiﬁcant minority populations.”).
84. Jacoby, supra note 15, at 1743-46.
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